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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EVIDENCE--ADMISSIBILITY OF
BLOOD SAMPLE
While awaiting trial on charge of murder, defendant was
given, pursuant to a New Jersey health statute,' a physical exam-
ination during which a sample of his blood was taken for the
ostensible purpose of testing for venereal disease. The board of
health turned over an unused portion to public authorities. The
state introduced evidence that the blood found on the murder
weapon was the same type as that of the defendant, and defen-
dant was convicted, despite the fact that he did not know that the
blood test would be used against him in the murder trial. On ap-
peal, held: affirmed.2 Even if the taking of a blood sample were
an unreasonable search and seizure, nevertheless the sample is
admissible into evidence, and the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is not violated.
Defendant claimed invasion of his right against unreasonable
search and seizure guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution.3
The court, on re-examination, affirmed its previous position4 that
such examination was not unreasonable, and that even if it were,
the evidence so obtained would nevertheless be admissible. On
the issue of admissibility of evidence obtained by unreasonable
search and seizure, the court's position is supported by a substan-
tial weight of authority, although a minority of the states fol-
low the opposite, federal rule.6
On the issue of self-incrimination, there are again two schools
of thought. The first is that the admission into evidence of re-
sults obtained from physical examinations against the will of
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-49.7 (Cum. Supp. 1951).
2. State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A.2d 441 (1951).
3. Id. at 589, 83 A.2d at 443.
4. State v. McQueen, 69 N.J.L. 522, 55 AtI. 1006 (1903).
5. For a collection of the cases, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2183 (3d ed.
1940).
6. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2184-2184b (3d ed. 1940). These minority courts are now committed to
the exclusionary rule which declares incompetent in criminal proceedings
evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures made by
agents of the accusing states. The protection of the rule is available to
those persons whose constitutional rights are violated by the invasion and
who satisfy certain procedural requirements.
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the accused is a violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion contained in state constitutions.7 In addition such examina-
tion has been held to be a denial of state constitutional due proc-
ess., It has even been held that express consent to the examina-
tion is required.,
Dean Wigmore has best expressed the other view concerning
self-incrimination by urging that the privilege was established in
the common law to protect the individual against the employment
of legal process to extract from his own lips an admission of his
guilt.10 This approach was taken by the prosecution in the prin-
cipal case." In line with this view, substantial authority holds
that police agencies do not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination by making a blood test to ascertain paternity,'12
or intoxication. 3 The consent of the accused to physical exam-
ination has been held to be inconsequential. 14 The grounds for
these rulings are best expressed in the New Jersey case of
Bartletta v. McFeeley," in which the court said that the right
to fingerprint and photograph for police files those arrested
in criminal cases is supported by convenience and the
public interest. - The New Jersey Court, in the principal case,
stated by way of analogy that there is no substantial differ-
ence between obtaining a specimen of blood from the accused and
obtaining his fingerprints or physical property, the possession of
7. Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim Rep 593 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940);
Bethel v. State, 178 Ark. 277, 10 S.W.2d 370 ?1928). There is no New
Jersey Constitutional provision dealing expressly with the prohibition
against self-incrimination, but N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:97-7 (1939) provides
that no witness shall be compelled to answer any question if the answer
will expose him to a criminal prosecution or penalty or to a forfeiture of his
estate. New Jersey considers the common law doctrine to be in full force.
State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 620, 55 Atl. 743 (1903).
8. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902).
9. State v. Matsinger, 180 S.W. 856 (Mo. 1915); State v. Horton, 247
Mo. 657, 153 S.W. 1051 (1913). Defendant's argument in the principal case
seems even to go beyond this, in that he claims that before a consent could
be spelled out, the state must show affirmatively that the defendant had
full knowledge of the proposed use when he permitted his blood to be taken.
10. 8 WIGMOkE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (3d ed. 1940).
11. State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 593, 83 A.2d 441, 444 (1951).
12. Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N.J. Super, 152, 76 A.2d 717 (1950); 8 WIG-
10RE, EVIDENCE § 2265 (3d ed. 1940).
13. People v. Tucker, 105 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941 (1948) ; 8 WiG-
woRE, EVIDENCE § 2265 (3d ed. 1940).
14. People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 2d 199, 168 P.2d
443 (1946); State v. Ayres, 70 Idaho 18, 121 P.2d 142 (1949); State v.
Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950).
15. 107 N.J. Eq. 141, 152 Atl. 17 (1930).
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which is a pertinent issue in a felony charge against defendant,
and concluded that the defendant's right against self-incrimi-
nation had not been violated.
In a recent leading case, a stomach pump was used on defen-
dant to cause him to spit up two capsules of previously swallowed
morphine. This evidence was introduced, and, as a result, the de-
fendant was convicted of possessing narcotics. The California
District Court of Appeal decision16 was consistent with the prin-
cipal case in holding that evidence improperly obtained could be
introduced on the ground that illegality of search does not affect
admissibility of evidence. On certiorari, however, the United
States Supreme Court held that this forced extraction was a vio-
lation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution in that it constituted a coerced con-
fessionY.1 This was not treated by the Court as either an in-
stance of unreasonable search and seizure or of self-incrimina-
tion, since the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not apply to
state action.'8 The ruling indicates, however, that due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment may be invoked to inhibit
state action similar to, although more extreme than, that of the
principal case.
The prevailing view, expressed in the principal case, may lead
to unexpected results. In the present zeal for the clean-up of
crime, powers which may boomerang have been allowed law en-
forcement agencies. Although the stricter view may in some in-
stances protect the guilty, such an occasional result would appear
to be a mere incidental by-product of a sounder procedure which
eventually would force the prosecutor to obtain evidence from
other sources.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF RELIGION-PARENTS'
DUTY TO PROVIDE MEDICAL ATTENTION
Parents of an infant child suffering from a serious blood con-
dition refused, on religious grounds, to consent to a blood trans-
fusion. Pursuant to a statute authorizing the appointment of a
guardian for neglected childen, an order was sought for appoint-
16. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 225 P.2d 1 (1950), reheaming
denied (by the California Supreme Court), id. at 143, 225 P.2d at 9913(1951).
17. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
18. Ibid.
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